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PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN SECURITIES




Can I or can't I? That is the question facing thousands of arbitra-
tors sitting in securities arbitration disputes throughout the country
considering requests for punitive damages. In other words, should an
arbitrator punish the wrongdoer beyond the actual compensatory loss
suffered by the complaining party? More importantly, does an arbi-
trator have the authority to award such damages?
The decision of whether to award punitive damages, however, is
not limited to securities arbitration. Indeed, other industries, busi-
nesses and professions have also wrestled with the propriety and ef-
fects of punitive damage awards.' As a result, judges and scholars
alike have been raising and debating fundamental questions in an at-
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1. See L. SCHLUETER & K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES (2d ed. 1989) § 1.0
[hereinafter SCHLUETER & REDDEN]. For example, regarding: 'defective products, see
id. at § 9.5; medical malpractice, see id. at § 9.1 1(D)(2); attorney malpractice, see id. at
§ 9.1 1(D)(3); druggist malpractice, see id. at § 9.1 I(D)(4), accountant malpractice, see id.
at § 9.1 l(D)(6). See also Freudenheim, Business and Health Debate on Plan to Limit
Lawsuits, N.Y. Times, May 28, 1991 at D2, col. 1; Dunne, Pass Bush's Civil Rights Mea-
sure, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1991 at L23, col. 3; Review and Outlook, American Competi-
tiveness, Wall St. J., Aug. 14, 1991 at A8, col. 1; A Plague of Lawyers, The Economist,
Aug. 10, 1991 at 13; Hilts, Bush Enters Malpractice Debate with Plan to Limit Court
Awards, N.Y. Times, May 13, 1991, at Al, col. 1; Stout, Bush Seeks to Compel States to
Limit Damage Awards in Malpractice Cases, Wall St. J., May 16, 1991 at A4, col. 1;
Quayle Asks Curbs on Punitive Awards, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 1991 at 3, col. 3; Consumer
Group, Bar Association Blasts Quayle's Legal Reform Plan, Investor's Daily, Aug. 15,
1991 at 20, col. 1; Katsoris, Accountants' Third Party Liability - How Far Do We Go?,
36 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1967-68); Legal Affairs, The Class Action Against Product
Liability Laws, Business Week, July 29, 1991 at 74; Editorial, A Trojan Horse, Nat. Law
J., Aug. 5, 1991 at 12, col. 1:
EVERY YEAR SOMEONE in Congress tries to muster support for a federal
products liability law. And every year, the proposal seems to fall by the way-
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tempt to determine when and how punitive damages should be
awarded. For example, what are the guidelines for imposing such
damages? When are they justified? Even when justified, are they ex-
cessive, and do they therefore defeat the punitive or deterrent effect
which they originally sought to accomplish? To date, no clear resolu-
tion is in sight. Indeed, it often appears as though the courts and
legislatures were creating a "Tower of Babel"2 by discussing the issue
in differing languages and dialects.
It is not, however, the aim of this article to solve the punitive dam-
ages puzzle. Instead, after briefly outlining the nature of punitive
damages and tracing the background of securities arbitration, the dis-
cussion will settle on the narrower topic of whether punitive damages
- in whatever form permitted in courtroom litigation - should be
allowed to be meted out by non-judicial arbitrators sitting in consen-
sual forums involving securities disputes.
II. Punitive Damages
"Punitive" or "exemplary" damages - in excess of compensatory
damages3 - are widely recognized in civil litigation. Indeed, multiple
or punitive damage awards have been in existence since the Code of
Hammurabi in 2000 B.C.4 Such damages are generally accepted or
rejected on policy grounds, and are usually imposed to punish the
defendant and serve as a warning or example to others who may com-
side. This year's legislative session has brought us the Product Liability Fair-
ness Act of 1991.
There are seductive justifications for a comprehensive, nationwide law. The
United States has become a national market. The patchwork quilt of state laws
presents a bewildering challenge to manufacturers and their lawyers. A federal
regulatory scheme would bring some coherence to the law.
But in the past, similar proposals have been a barely concealed effort to re-
strict the rights of consumers to bring suit against manufacturers that sell defec-
tive and dangerous goods. This year's version mostly avoids harsh limits.
Still, plaintiffs' lawyers and their allies are saying the new modest proposals
lay the path for more restrictive measures. If that's the case, it does a disservice
to the public, which is owed a full and comprehensive debate of the issue."
Id.
2. Babel is a biblical city where the building of a tower is held in Genesis to have
been interrupted by the confusion of languages. See Genesis 11:1-9. See also WEBSTER'S
NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 122 (1989).
3. Those allowed as a recompense for the injury actually received. See 1
BOUVIERE'S LAW DICTIONARY 750 (3d rev. 1914) (emphasis added).
4. See, e.g., THE BABLYONIAN LAWS 19, (G. Driver & J. Miles trans. 1955). "If the
seller (meanwhile) goes to (his) fate, the buyer shall take 5-fold (the amount of) the claim
in that suit from the house of the seller." Id. See also SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra
note 1, § 1.0 at 3.
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mit similar outrageous acts in the future.' In justifying this rationale
of deterrence, most courts require a finding of malice or some other
comparable act.6
Although exemplary damages are punitive in nature, they lack the
safeguards generally afforded criminal penalties.7 Furthermore, be-
cause of the frequency and magnitude of punitive damages,' the valid-
ity and propriety of such awards has come under increasing scrutiny
by the courts, legislatures and legal scholars.9 In fact, the turmoil and
uncertainty surrounding the excessiveness of punitive damage awards
was recently raised before the Supreme Court in Pacific Mutual Life
Insurance Company v. Haslip.'0 In upholding the punitive damage
award at issue, the Court left undecided the extent to which "due
process" acts as a check on a jury's discretion to award punitive dam-
ages in the absence of any express' statutory limit. II In a dissenting
opinion, however, Justice O'Connor pointed out that:
[U]nlimited jury discretion - or unlimited judicial discretion for
that matter - in the fixing of punitive damages may invite extreme
results that jar one's constitutional sensibilities .... We need not,
and indeed we cannot draw a mathematical straight line between
the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unaccept-
able that would fit every case. We can say, however, that general
concerns of reasonableness and adequate guidance from the court
when the case is tried to a jury properly enters the constitutional
calculus. 2
5. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.1(c) at 23.
6. Id., § 2.2(a)(1) at 26. The rationale of deterrence is particularly justified where
the wrongdoer has received or expects to receive financial or other benefits from his mis-
conduct. Id. Moreover, punitive damages act as an incentive to wronged parties to seek
redress, even though their damages - in relation to the relative cost of litigation - are
nominal; otherwise, the wrongdoers' behavior would go unchecked to the detriment of
society as a whole. Id., § 2.2(c)(1) at 30-31.
7. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 1.3(F) at 11.
8. See Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L.
REV. 139 (1986); Note, The Imposition of Punishment by Civil Courts: A Reappraisal of
Punitive Damages, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1158 (1966); Note, Punitive Damages: An Appeal
for Deterrence, 61 NEB. L. REV. 651 (1982).
9. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 3.0 at 37.
10. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
11. Although the jury award was not broken down, it appears that over 80% of the
more than one million dollar verdict was punitive in nature. Id. at 1037, n.2. See also
Pacific Mutual Life v. Haslip: Supreme Court Refuses to Specify Due Process Standards
for Awarding Punitive Damages, 4 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, at 5 (Jan. 1991); Note,
Can Punitive Damages Withstand a Due Process Challege After Bankers Life & Casualty
Co. v. Crenshaw and Browning-Ferris Industries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal?, 18 FORD-
HAM UR. L.J. 121 (1990).
12. Pacific Mutual Life, 111 S. Ct. at 1043 (emphasis added).
1991]
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One of the arguments against awarding punitive damages is that
the law has already made sufficient provisions for deterrence and pun-
ishment that eliminates the need for exemplary damages.13 It is pre-
cisely for this reason that the securities industry feels punitive damage
awards are inappropriate and unnecessary in brokers' disputes. To be
sure, the heavy regulation of the securities industry on both the fed-
eral and state levels, supplanted by the industry's own self-regulating
system,14 constitutes a significant deterrent by allowing for punish-
ment of those activities which contravene industry rules and regula-
tions.15 Accordingly, the securities industry takes the position that
the enforcement procedures resulting from such regulation "serve the
needs of society to hold out as examples those who violate the mores
of the industry. This is done in a very public forum with all of the due
process safeguards and is a far better manner than any private arbitra-
tion or, for that matter, private civil suit, could ever accomplish."' 6
Needless to say, investors and their representatives do not share this
conclusion. 17
The effectiveness of the securities industry's current mechanisms
for deterrence, however, need not be addressed in this article. Rather,
this article focuses on the assault against the awardability of punitive
damages through arbitration, and rejects any notion that judges and
juries can award punitive damages in securities disputes while arbitra-
tors cannot.' To whatever extent these damages are awardable in
13. For example, injunctive relief is available in equity to deter continued wrongdo-
ing. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.2(a)(2) at 28.
14. Organizations such as the National Association of Securities Dealers (NASD),
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and various other Securities Regulatory Organi-
zations (SROs) act as internal regulators of the securities industry. See infra note 220
and accompanying text.
15. See Address by William J. Fitzpatrick (General Counsel of the Securities Industry
Association) before the New York County Lawyers Association (May 29, 1991.) (A copy
of this speech, entitled "Punitive Damages In Arbitration: Should They Be Permitted In
New York State?", is on file at the office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
16. Id. at 7-8.
17. See S. GOLDBERG, PIABA's 1991 REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN SECURI-
TIES ARBITRATION 2 (1991): "In the final analysis, securities arbitration without the pos-
sibility of punitive damages being awarded in egregious cases, would be no more effective
in discouraging grossly fraudulent conduct than would be a grand larceny auto theft
statute that limited punishment upon conviction to divestiture of the stolen car." See also
Raytheon Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989):
"[P]unitive damages serve as an effective deterrent to malicious or fraudulent conduct.
Where such conduct could give rise to punitive damages if proved in court, there is no
compelling reason to prohibit a party which proves the same conduct to a panel of arbi-
trators from recovering the same damages." Id. at 12; Watterson, Vulnerability Fate of
Widows and Widowers, Boston Globe, Sept. 9, 1991, at 20, col. 3.
18. See infra notes 72-146 and accompanying text. See also Stipanowich, Punitive
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
courtroom litigation, they should be similarly permitted in
arbitration.
III. History of Securities Arbitration
Arbitration is hardly a modern day phenomenon. It was Aristotle
who wrote:
Equity is justice in that it goes beyond the written law. And it is
equitable to prefer arbitration to the law court, for the arbitrator
keeps equity in view, whereas the judge looks only to the law, and
the reason why arbitrators were appointed was that equity might
prevail. 19
The use of arbitration to resolve securities disputes is equally estab-
lished; its origins trace back to, the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) in 1872.20 Since that time, numerous other Securities Regu-
latory Organizations (SROs) have established arbitration programs
for the settlement of such disputes.21
To fully understand the present rules governing the arbitration of
securities disputes, it is important to look at the developments that
have been responsible for channeling such disputes into arbitration. 22
Consideration must also be given to legislative attempts to alter or
influence the scope of securities arbitration. 23 Finally, the establish-
ment and work of the Securities Industry Conference on Arbitration
(SICA) and the oversight role of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC or Commission)24 should also be examined.
Damages in Arbitration: Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc. Reconsidered, 66 B.U.L. REV. 953
(1986).
19. THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL (compiled by SICA) (1989) (on file at the office of
the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
20. P. HOBLIN, SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURES, STRATEGIES, CASES 1-2
(1988).
21. Id.
22. See infra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
23. See Draft Bill To Restrict Use of Pre-Dispute Agreements, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMEN-
TATOR 3, at 4 (June 1988); State Actions on Pre-Dispute Clauses, I SEC. ARB. COMMEN-
TATOR 9 (Aug. 1988). Massachusetts, for example, undertook a particularly serious
attempt to regulate arbitration agreements. See Neeseman, After McMahon and Rodri-
quez: The State of the Law, SEC. ARB. 217, 279.3 (1989). The Massachusetts rule barred
licensed broker-dealers from requiring investors to sign pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments, and mandated that brokers disclose fully to investors the legal effects of arbitra-
tion agreements. In Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, both the District and Circuit
courts ruled that such state regulations were preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.
703 F.Supp. 146, 153 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1114, 1120 (1st Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 2559 (1990). See also Hinden, GAO Asked to Investigate Securities
Arbitration Issues, Wash. Post, Feb. 7, 1990 at 2, col. 1.
24. See infra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
19911
578 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVIII
A. SRO Arbitrations
An unresolved dispute between an investor and his broker ordina-
rily ends in arbitration because of an arbitration agreement executed
at the time a customer opens an account with his broker.25 Under the
Federal Arbitration Act (FAA or Arbitration Act),26 agreements to
arbitrate future disputes are, for the most part, specifically enforcea-
ble.27 Before 1987, however, it was generally presumed that claims
based upon federal securities laws - namely the Securities Act of
193328 (1933 Act or Securities Act) and the Securities Exchange Act
of 193429 (1934 Act or Exchange Act) - could not be arbitrated
without the customer's consent, despite the existence of a pre-dispute
25. See Katsoris, The Level Playing Field, 17 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 419, 469 (1988-
89) [hereinafter Katsoris I]. SROs require by rule that their membership consent to arbi-
trate disputes with their customers. By belonging to an SRO, members agree to be bound
by the SRO's rules. Consequently, customers of an SRO may compel a member of an
SRO to arbitrate; however, absent a written contract, the member cannot compel the
customer to arbitrate. See P. HOBLIN, supra note 20, at 2-3 to 2- 4. The standard arbitra-
tion clause "authorizes the customer to elect the arbitration forum from a list of several
organizations. If the customer does not elect the forum within five days after receipt
from the broker-dealer of a notification requesting such election, the broker-dealer be-
comes authorized to make the election." Exchange Act Release No. 15,984 n.4 (July 2,
1979), reprinted in 17 SEC Docket 1167, 1169 n.4 (June-Aug. 1979). The extent to which
customers are, as a practical matter, "required" to sign what can basically be described as
a typical industry-wide agreement containing a pre-dispute arbitration clause is a critical
question. This is particularly so if "the customer may be precluded from doing business
with the broker-dealer if he or she refuses to sign the agreement or the broker-dealer is
unwilling to accept any modification of its terms." Id. at 1169. It would appear that
such arbitration agreements are in effect largely with respect to margin, option and com-
modity accounts, and, to a lesser degree, cash accounts. See Stansbury & Klein, The
Arbitration of Investor-Broker Disputes: A Summary of Development, 35 ARB. J. 30, 32
(1980); see also Fletcher, Dynamism in Securities Arbitration, in SECURITIES ARBITRA-
TION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 1, 14 (1989). A "1988 SEC study of 65 brokerage
firms showed that 61% of all cash accounts had no arbitration agreement in effect; 6% of
margin accounts had no arbitration agreement; and 5% of option accounts had no arbi-
tration agreement." Id. This difference probably stems from the fact that the latter two
usually involve greater risk or an extension of some form of credit by the firm to the
customer, thus increasing the need for speedy resolution of problems through arbitration.
See also Ryder, Securities Arbitration in 1989: Reviewing The Case Law, Securities Arbi-
tration Practice and Procedures, SEC ARB. INST. AND SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 37
(1989); Grant, Securities Arbitration: Is Required Arbitration Fair To Investors?, 24 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 389 (1990).
26. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
27. Section 2 of the Arbitration Act provides: "A written provision in ... 'a contract
evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereaf-
ter arising out of such contract . . . shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract." Id. at § 2.
(emphasis added).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1982).
29. Id. at § 78.
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agreement to arbitrate.3"
In 1987, the Supreme Court nullified this presumption in Shearson!
American Express, Inc. v. McMahon 3 by upholding the enforceability
of pre-dispute arbitration agreements as to 1934 Act claims; 32 shortly
thereafter, in Rodriquez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express,33
the Court extended such enforceability to claims under the 1933
Act. 34 The significance of McMahon is evident in that it resulted in a
dramatic shift in forum - from the courtroom to arbitration - for
the resolution of securities disputes, particularly for 1934 Act
claims.35 In fact, in the first full year before McMahon (1986), less
than 3,000 securities arbitrations were filed with participating SROs,36
whereas in the first full year after McMahon (1988), over 6,000 securi-
ties cases were filed with participating SROs, 37 and nearly 500 with
the American Arbitration Association (AAA).38
B. Creation of SICA
Prior to 1977, most SROs had differing rules for the administration
of securities arbitration disputes.3 9 In June of 1976, the SEC began to
address this problem by soliciting comments on the feasibility of de-
veloping a uniform system of dispute grievance procedures for the ad-
judication of small claims.4' In response, several SROs proposed that
a securities industry task force be established to consider the develop-
30. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953), which held that Congress' desire to pro-
tect investors would be more effectively served by holding unenforceable any pre-dispute
arbitration agreements relating to issues arising under the 1933 Act. Most federal courts
applied this prohibition equally to 1934 Act claims. See also Katsoris I, supra note 25, at
425.
31. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
32. See Katsoris, Securities Arbitration After McMahon, 16 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 361,
366 (1987-88) (hereinafter Katsoris II); Karmel, Arbitration and the Demise of Wilko v.
Swan, N.Y.L.J., June 15, 1989 at 3, col. 1.
33. 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
34. Id. at 483-85. See also, Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 426.
35. More Federal securities claims brought against brokers by the public are brought
pursuant to the 1934 Act rather than under the 1933 Act. This is because the latter
statute is concerned with the initial distribution of securities, whereas the former deals
primarily with post-distribution trading. See Katsoris, The Securities Arbitrator's
Nightmare, 14 FORD. URB. L.J. 3, 7 (1986) (hereinafter Katsoris III).
36. See SEVENTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBI-
TRATION (July 1991) [hereinafter SEVENTH REPORT] (on file at the office of the Fordham
Urban Law Journal.)
37. Id. For a breakdown of the arbitrations handled by the arbitration facilities of the
various SROs since 1980, see id. at 24-27.
38. See Katsoris, supra note 25 at 469-70. To the extent the AAA acts as an alterna-
tive to SRO arbitration see id. at 469-72.
39. Id. at 427.
40. Id.
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ment of such a uniform code. 4 1 Accordingly, SICA - consisting of
representatives of various SROs,12 the Securities Industry Association
(SIA)43 and the public44 - was established in April of 1977."5
Pursuant to its mandate, SICA first developed a simplified arbitra-
tion procedure for resolving small claims 46 and issued an informa-
tional booklet describing such procedures (Small Claims Booklet).47
Realizing that the development of a small claims procedure was only
a first step, SICA then developed a comprehensive Uniform Code of
Arbitration (Uniform Code or Code) to be used by the securities in-
dustry.4 In addition, SICA prepared an explanatory booklet (Proce-
41. Id.
42. The following SROs were represented: The American (ASE), Boston (BSE), Cin-
cinnati (CSE), Midwest (MSE), New York (NYSE), Pacific (PSE) and Philadelphia
(PHSE) Stock Exchanges the Chicago Board of Options Exchange (CBOE), the Munici-
pal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) and the National Association of Securities
Dealers, Inc. (NASD). FIFTH REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON
ARBITRATION 3 (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter FIFTH REPORT] (on file at the office of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal).
43. Id. The SIA is a trade association for the securities industry.
44. Peter R. Celia, Jr., Esq., and the author have served continuously as Public Mem-
bers of SICA since its creation in 1977; Mortimer Goodman, Esq. was similarly ap-
pointed as a Public Member in 1977 and continued to serve until he retired in 1989. Id.
In 1983, Justin Klein, Esq., was added as the fourth Public Member of SICA. Id. Upon
the retirement of Mortimer Goodman in 1989, James E. Beckley, Esq. was selected by the
remaining public members to fill this vacancy. The current public members' terms shall
expire one a year, beginning on December 31, 1989. See SICA: Pre-dispute Clauses Stay
in Customer Agreements, 1 SEC. ARB. 6 (Sept. 1988). They are each eligible for reap-
pointment for a new four-year term. All new members will serve for four years and are
eligible for one additional four-year term. The public members whose terms are not ex-
piring will determine the appointment of new members or reappointments. Id. The ap-
pointment, or reappointment, may be vetoed by a two-thirds vote of the non-public
members of SICA. Id. Justin Klein, Esq., whose term expired at the end of 1990, was
reappointed in 1991 to a new four-year term.
45. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 42, at 3.
46. Id. The original jurisdictional limit for small claims was $3,000 which was subse-
quently raised to $5,000, and then again to $10,000, the present limit. See SEC Approves
NASD Proposal to Raise Ceiling for Simplified Arbitrations, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA)
No. 20, 15 560 (Apr. 15, 1988). See also D. Lipton Study, 1 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 5
(June 1988); T. Wynn, Seminar Highlights: Securities Arbitration Update, SEC. ARB.
COMMENTARY (Oct. 1989).
47. See REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION: Proposals to Establish a Uniform Sys-
tem for the Resolution of Customer Disputes Involving Small Claims, "How to Proceed
with the Arbitration of a Small Claim" (Appendix D) (Nov. 15, 1977) [hereinafter FIRST
REPORT] (on file at the office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal). The small claims
procedure was incorporated into § 2 of the Uniform Code of Arbitration. See THIRD
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION TO THE SE-
CURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 3 (Jan. 31, 1980) [hereinafter THIRD REPORT]
(on file at the office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
48. See Uniform Code of Arbitration (as amended), reprinted in FOURTH REPORT OF
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
dures Booklet),49 outlining procedures under the Code.
The original Uniform Code was adopted by the participating SROs
during 1979 and 1980.50 Since the adoption of the Code, SICA has
regularly monitored its operation and made numerous amendments,
revisions and additions thereto."' In addition, SICA prepared an Ar-
bitrator's Manual (Manual)52 to instruct arbitrators concerning their
duties and responsibilities. This manual, along with the Code and the
Procedures Booklet, continues to be revised and updated by SICA.53
It should be noted that SICA has always been concerned with im-
proving the image of SRO arbitration as a speedy, economic and fair
method for the resolution of securities disputes.54 SICA has also
sought, to the extent possible, to achieve uniformity in the SRO rules
and consistency in their application.55 Moreover, since many of the
post-McMahon changes have increased the duration and cost of arbi-
tration proceedings generally,5 6 resultant escalating costs have also
become a concern of SICA. For these reasons, SICA commissioned a
study in 1990 to examine the feasibility of using a single forum to
administer all arbitrations involving the securities industry.57 A re-
port from this study has recently been submitted to SICA. Although
SICA has concluded that no material economies of scale would result
from a single forum, it will continue to explore methods of improving
the governance and image of SRO arbitration.
THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION, Exhibit C (Nov. 1984)
[hereinafter FOURTH REPORT] (on file at the office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
49. See THIRD REPORT, supra note 47, at 5. After McMahon, SICA consolidated the
Small Claims Booklet, (supra note 47) into the PROCEDURES BOOKLET. See SIXTH RE-
PORT OF THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY CONFERENCE ON ARBITRATION 3 (Aug. 1989)
[hereinafter SIXTH REPORT] (on file at the office of the Fordham Urban Law Journal).
50. See FIFTH REPORT, supra note 42, at 4. Every time SICA adopts a new rule, each
SRO must generally seek a rule change from its respective organization and subsequently
submit the proposed rule to the SEC for approval. Accordingly, there is often a time lag
between SICA approval and SRO action.
51. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 1-3.
52. THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 19.
53. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 3. After McMahon, the Small Claims Book-
let was merged into the PROCEDURES BOOKLET. See supra notes 47 & 49.
54. See Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 430-31.
55. Id. at 452-54.
56. Id. at 472-75.
57. See Siconolfi, Street Eager for Arbitration Superforum, Wall St. J., Aug. 24, 1990,
at Cl, col. 1. See also Morris and Masucci, Securities Arbitration at Self-Regulatory Or-
ganizations: New York Stock Exchange and National Association of Securities Dealers -
Administration and Procedures, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1991, at 219, 229 (PLI
Seminar): "Increased caseload has strained the existing facilities. SROs are studying the
feasibility of a central arbitration forum." Id.
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IV. Punitive Damages in Arbitration
A. Relevant Federal Statutes
There are a variety of federal statutes dealing with substantive
causes of action, choice of forum and form of damages, which impact
securities arbitration and punitive damages. Collectively, these stat-
utes send somewhat mixed signals regarding the awardability of puni-
tive damages in arbitration. For example, the FAA, although silent
on the specific issue of punitive damages, evinces a strong policy in
favor of settling disputes through the forum of arbitration.5" Further-
more, because the FAA applies to claims arising from transactions
involving interstate commerce, 59 and because securities dealings usu-
ally involve such transactions, state securities claims, as well as those
arising under federal securities laws, are usually subject to the FAA. 60
From a substantive perspective, however, claimants who choose to
bring a cause of action under the federal securities laws may elect
arbitration as a forum but are nonetheless precluded from recovering
punitive damages. 6' By the same token, other federal statutes man-
date the type of damages to be awarded. Two noteworthy examples
of such statutes - which proscribe damage awards known as "treble
damages" at three times actual loss62 -  are the Clayton Anti-Trust
Act 63 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organization Act
(RICO).' Although some courts describe treble damage awards as
punitive,65 and others refer to them as remedial,66 treble damages are
decidedly punitive in nature.67  Thus, it is noteworthy that the
Supreme Court in McMahon unanimously 68 held that contractual
agreements to arbitrate claims asserted under RICO are specifically
58. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1
(1983).
59. See supra note 27.
60. See Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 424.
61. These claimants are equally precluded from recovering such damages in court-
room litigation. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 19.2(F) at 330; William J.
Fitzpatrick, supra note 15, at 8; S. GOLDBERG supra note 17, at 81.
62. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.1(B) at 21.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1982).
64. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c); See D. ABRAMs, THE LAW OF CIVIL RICO § 3.4.1 at 152
(1991).
65. In fact, the most common terms used to describe awards in excess of compensa-
tory damages are "punitive" and "exemplary" and, in most jurisdictions, these terms are
used interchangeably. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.0 at 19.
66. Id.
67. Id., § 2.1(B) at 21.
68. Although the court found unanimously on the RICO issue, it split 5-4 on the
issue of the arbitrability of 1934 Act claims. See supra notes 31-38 and accompanying
text.
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enforceable,69 suggesting that a punitive-like damage award is avail-
able through arbitration, at least for RICO claims. In fact, an arbitra-
tion award was recently vacated on the ground that an arbitration
panel showed a manifest disregard7° of the law in denying plaintiff's
RICO Act claims.7
B. Forum Rules
Although the SICA Code does not specifically mention punitive
damages, these damages are referenced in the Arbitrator's Manual72
which provides:
The issue of punitive damages may arise with great frequency in
arbitrations. Parties to arbitration are informed that arbitrators
can consider punitive damages as a remedy. Generally, in court
proceedings, punitive damages consist of compensation in excess of
actual damages and are awarded as a form of punishment against
the wrongdoer. . . . If punitive damages are awarded, the decision
of the arbitrators should clearly specify what portion of the award
is intended as punitive damages, and the arbitrators should con-
sider referring to the authority on which they relied.73
Moreover, in order to prevent the insertion of restrictive clauses in
customers' agreements, Section 31 of the Code specifically prohibits
conditions that "limit or contradict the rules of the SROs, or limit the
ability of a party to file any claim in arbitration or limit the ability of
the arbitrators to make any award."' 74 Although this prohibition does
not specifically mention punitive damages, it clearly expresses a
strong distaste for restrictions in customers' agreements which limit
the claim or award rendered by the arbitrators.75 In this regard,
choice-of-law provisions, which often appear in pre-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements and mandate the law to be applied in deciding the
dispute, can be restrictive. This is particularly true where a choice-of-
law provision subjects an investor to the law of a situs which has no
true relationship to the place where the business was conducted.76
It should also be noted that Section 28 of the SICA Code requires
an award to include summary data, such as a description of the issues
69. McMahon, 482 U.S. at 242. See Katsoris II, supra note 32, at 368.
70. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
71. See Robbins v. Paine Webber, Inc., 761 F. Supp. 773, (D. N. Ala. 1991)
72. See THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 19 and accompanying text.
73. Id. at 20.
74. See SIXTH REPORT, supra note 49, at 12 (emphasis added). See also Katsoris I,
supra note 25, at 452.
75. See Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 446.
76. See infra notes 109-45 and accompanying text.
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in controversy and the amounts claimed and awarded.77 Although
neither the NASD nor NYSE rules directly authorize punitive dam-
ages, the printed award form used by the NYSE designates a space for
the insertion of "punitive damage" awards.78 More significant, how-
ever, are the rules of the AAA, which specifically provide that arbitra-
tors may award "any remedy or relief which the -arbitrators deem just
and equitable and within the scope of the agreement of the
"179parties....
C. Judicial Interpretation
Since McMahon, the larger and more complicated cases are now
being litigated in arbitration instead of before judges and juries.
Although the SROs did not start making their awards public until
after McMahon, it has been reported that between 1987 and 1990
nearly $10,000,000 in punitive damages have been awarded in SRO
and AAA securities arbitrations; and, several of these awards have
been in amounts of one million dollars or more. s° Such awards have
served to escalate the simmering debate surrounding the authority to
award punitive damages through arbitration.
At the state level, courts have been unable to unanimously agree
upon the availability of punitive damages in arbitration.8 1 Most nota-
ble in opposing such arbitrable relief is the decision by the New York
Court of Appeals in Garrity v. Lyle Stuart, Inc.,2 which involved a
77. See Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 452.
78. See P. HOBLIN, supra note 20, at supp. S5-43-49; S. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at
2. No such designated space is provided on the NASD form of award. See Morris and
Masucci, supra note 57, at 318-20.
79. AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES § 43
(emphasis added). See also Friedman, AAA Securities Arbitration: What You Need To
Know, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1991, at 405, 419 (PLI Seminar). As to an arbitra-
tor's power to award injunctive relief, see Kavaler, Campbell, Rubinson, and Siskind, An
Overview of Industry Arbitration, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1991, at 669, 686 (PLI
Seminar). "Arbitration panels routinely award injunctive relief and may (and often do)
vacate judicial injunctions. Affidavits of Edward W. Morris Jr., formerly NYSE Director
of Arbitration and Robert Clemente, current NYSE Director of Arbitration. . . state that
arbitration panels have the power to grant injunctive relief and have done so in the past."
Id. See also THE ARBITRATOR'S MANUAL, supra note 19, at 19-22.
80. See S. GOLDBERG, supra'note 17, at 119-35. The Goldberg Survey reports 44
punitive awards, 13 at the AAA and 31 at SROs. Id. at 132-33. Moreover, the geograph-
ical breakdown includes twelve states, namely: Florida (17); New York (7); California
(5); Georgia (5); Texas (2); Wisconsin (2); and one each for Arizona, Missouri, North
Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma and Oregon. Id. See also Woman Awarded $419,000 Over
Mishandled Brokerage Account (Reuter Business Report), Sept. 4, 1991.
81. See State Law on Punitive Damages, 4 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, at 10-11
(Jan. 1991).
82. 40 N.Y.2d 354, 353 N.E.2d 793 (1976).
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dispute over payment of royalties. That court, some 15 years ago,
ruled in a 4-3 decision that an arbitrator lacked authority "to award
punitive damages, even if agreed upon by the parties.''1 3 The majority
reasoned:
If arbitrators were allowed to impose punitive damages, the useful-
ness of arbitration would be destroyed. It would become a trap for
the unwary given the eminently desirable freedom from judicial
overview of law and facts. It would mean that the scope of deter-
mination by arbitrators, by the license to award punitive damages,
would be both unpredictable and uncontrollable.8 4
The Garrity holding takes on added significance because of the preem-
inence of New York as a situs for arbitration."5
In disagreeing with the majority, 6 however, the three dissenting
judges in Garrity reasoned: "[T]he public policy which 'favors the
peaceful resolution of disputes through arbitration' outweighs the
public policy disfavoring the assessment of punitive damages in this
instance, where the unjustifiable conduct complained of is found to be
with malice."8s7 Interestingly, the only justice who partook in the
Garrity case and still sits on the New York Court of Appeals is Judge
Wachtler, currently that court's Chief Judge and one of the dissenters
in Garrity.88
Although some state courts disagree with the Garrity rationale,8 9 it
is the applicability of the FAA, with its strong policy in favor of arbi-
tration and a full spectrum of available remedies, 90 that has led the
assault against Garrity.9" Indeed, although most of the attack has oc-
curred in the federal courts,92 it is interesting to note the language of
Chief Judge Wachtler in a recent New York Court of Appeals deci-
sion, in which the entire court concurred: 93
Congress adopted the [Arbitration] Act to insure that the courts
would rigorously enforce private agreements to arbitrate, and it es-
83. Id. at 356, 353 N.E.2d at 794.
84. Id. at 359, 353 N.E.2d at 796.
85. Approximately 30% of all SRO arbitrations are held in New York City. See
Morris and Masucci, infra note 151 and accompanying text.
86. See Garrity, 40 N.Y.2d at 360-65, 353 N.E.2d at 797-801.
87. Id. at 363, 353 N.E.2d at 799.
88. See id. at 365, 353 N.E.2d at 801.
89. See State Law on Punitive Damages, supra note 81.
90. See supra notes 26-27 & 58-60 and accompanying text. See also Shell, ERISA and
Other Federal Employment Statutes: When is Commercial Arbitration an "Adequate Sub-
stitute"for the Courts?, 68 TEXAS L. REV. 509 (1990).
91. See infra notes 98-133 and accompanying text.
92. See infra notes 93-134 and accompanying text.
93. Singer v. Jeffries & Co., 78 N.Y.2d 76, 571 N.Y.S.2d 680 (1991).
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tablishes an 'emphatic' national policy favoring arbitration which
is binding on all courts, state and federal. Pursuant to the Arbitra-
tion Act, questions of arbitrability must be addressed with a
healthy regard for the federal policy.., and any doubts concerning
the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion. As is the case with any contract, the intention of the parties
is controlling, but [under the Arbitration Act] those intentions are
generously construed as to issues of arbitrability.94
Thus, if no interstate commerce is present, 95 an arbitrator sitting in
New York who awards punitive damages clearly risks vacation of the
award under Garrity;96 however, since most securities cases do in fact
involve an element of interstate commerce,97 the FAA should gener-
ally apply. In such cases, the question then becomes whether the fed-
eral law pre-empts state law on the issue of arbitrability. 9"
In fact, the issue of pre-emption has been debated frequently in the
federal courts. In Duggal International, Inc. v. Sallmetall,99 for exam-
ple, a New York federal court refused to apply Garrity because it
placed "substantive limits on arbitrability."' m The Duggal court re-
lied on the supremacy of federal law in reasoning that the FAA pre-
empted New York state law. 101 Furthermore, the court stated that
given the broad mandate of the Arbitration Act, public policy excep-
tions to arbitrability should be sparingly created. 102 The Duggal court
then adopted language similar to that used by Judge Wachtler in
Singer v. Jeffries,10 3 and concluded that "courts must broadly con-
strue the [arbitration] agreement and resolve all doubts in favor of the
arbitrator's authority."'" In addition, even though the intention of
the parties is generally controlling, under the FAA "those intentions
are generously construed as to issues of arbitrability."' 15 This expan-
94. Id. at 81, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 682 (citations omitted).
95. See supra notes 27 & 59 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. Indeed, the securities market can
properly be described as global in nature. See Henriques, Seeking Global Rules for Bro-
kers, N.Y. Times, July 14, 1991 § F (Money), at 15, col. 3; Exchange Chief Predicts
Global Stock Market Soon, Wall St. J., April 10, 1991, at 8, col. 6.
98. See infra notes 99-134 and accompanying text.
99. No. 84 Civ. 7170, slip. op. (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
100. Id. at 3.
101. Specifically, Duggal looked to the Supreme Court's decision in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), which held that any state law in direct conflict with the
Federal Arbitration Act violates the supremecy clause of the United States Constitution.
See also Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
102. Duggal, No. 84 Civ. 7170, slip. op. at 4.
103. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text.
104. Duggal, No. 84 Civ. 7170, slip. op. at 4.
105. Mitsubishi Motors v. Solar Chrysler, 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
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sive role for arbitration was reinforced by the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in McMahon 106 which unanimously held that RICO claims -
with their treble damage feature 1°7 - were specifically arbitrable.'l 8
In Bonar v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,109 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed a punitive damage award
issued in an AAA arbitration and remanded the case for a new hear-
ing before a different panel of arbitrators because of a witness' perjury.
In approving the arbitrator's authority to issue a punitive damage
award under the broad AAA rules,I10 the court - despite a New
York choice-of-law provision invoking Garrity's prohibition on puni-
tive damages - reasoned that "a choice of law provision in a contract
governed by the Arbitration Act merely designates the substantive
law that the arbitrators must apply in determining whether the con-
duct of the parties warrants an award of punitive damages; it does not
deprive the arbitrators of their authority to award punitive
damages.""'I
The pre-emption and choice-of-law rationale invoked by the lower
federal courts" 12 came under attack in Volt Information Sciences, Inc.
v. Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University."I3 The
United States Supreme Court in Volt recognized a California choice-
of-law clause which provided that the construction contract at issue
would be governed by the law of "'the place where the [p]roject is
located.' "1"4 The Volt court reasoned:
We do not think the Court of Appeals offended the Moses H. Cone
principle by interpreting the choice-of-law provision to mean that
the parties intended the California rules of arbitration ... to apply
to their arbitration agreement. There is no federal policy favoring
arbitration under a certain set of procedural rules; the federal pol-
icy is simply to ensure the enforceability, according to their terms,
of private agreements to arbitrate. Interpreting a choice-of-law
clause to make applicable state rules governing the conduct of arbi-
tration - rules which are manifestly designed to encourage resort
to the arbitral process -simply does not offend the rule of liberal
construction set forth in Moses H. Cone, nor does it offend any
106. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
107. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text. See also, SCHLUETER & REDDEN,
supra note 1, § 19.1(L) at 313.
108. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
109. 835 F.2d 1378 (11th Cir. 1988).
110. See SECURITIES ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 79 and accompanying text.
111. 835 F.2d at 1387.
112. See supra notes 99-111.
113. 489 U.S. 468 (1989).
114. Id. at 470. See also Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 450 n.247.
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other policy embodied in the FAA.'15
Since many arbitration agreements contain a New York choice-of-
law clause,' 16 the effect of Volt-on the applicability of Garrity is un-
clear and unsettling. An expansive view of Volt takes the position that
the opinion "endorsed the right of the parties to contract to agree on
its terms and be bound thereby; "7 and, that "such contracts could be
enforced so long as there is not pre-emption." '1 18 Yet, a more restric-
tive interpretation reasons that Volt merely established:
a substance and procedure distinction, with parties agreeing
only to the application of the state's substantive law - unless it is
stated to the contrary. Thus, with respect to punitive damages, a
standard choice-of-law clause governed by the Federal Arbitration
Act would be designating only that part of the state's law necessary
to determine whether the conduct merits the awarding of such
damages, not whether the arbitrators have the power to award
them; the more important determination (i.e., the power to award)
would be governed by federal law.119
The First Circuit adopted this restrictive interpretation in Raytheon
Co. v. Automated Business Systems, Inc., 2 ° which dealt with an AAA
punitive award and a California choice-of-law provision. In uphold-
ing the punitive award on grounds that AAA rules give arbitrators
broad authority to award any remedy or relief,' 2' the court refused to
apply Volt in interpreting the choice-of-law clause. 122 Instead, it dis-
tinguished Volt by reasoning that the instant case involved the very
scope of the arbitration, thus requiring the application of the "'settled
federal rule' that 'due regard must be given to the federal policy favor-
ing arbitration, and ambiguities as in favor of arbitration.' ",123
The Raytheon decision, however, did not definitively dispense with
the problems posed by reading Volt in conjunction with Garrity. In
fact, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York recently handed down two decisions involving Garrity -
115. 489 U.S. at 476 (emphasis added).
116. See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 80; Kupperman and Freeman III, Selected
Topics in Securities Arbitration: Rule 15c2-2, Fraud, Duress. Unconscionability, Waiver,
Class Arbitration, Punitive Damages, Rights of Review, and Attorneys' Fees and Costs, 65
TULANE L. REV. 1547, 1599 (1991).
117. Stewart, Punitive Damages In Arbitration: Fish or Cut Bait, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 21,
1991, at 5, col. 1.
118. Id. at 6.
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. 882 F.2d 6 (1st Cir. 1989).
121. See supra notes 79 & 110 and accompanying text.
122. Raytheon, 882 F.2d at 11 n.5.
123. Id. at 11-12 n.5.
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Fahnestock v. Waltman 124 and Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton,
Inc. 125 - which further muddied the waters. Fahnestock involved di-
versity jurisdiction'26 - but no choice-of-law clause - and a. punitive
damage award issued by a NYSE panel. In vacating the NYSE puni-
tive award on the basis of Garrity, the court noted that although the
NYSE rules contained no restriction on the awardability of punitive
damages, its rules on arbitrators' powers were not as broad as the
AAA's. 27 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed Fahnestock by a 2-
1 decision, emphasizing the diversity aspect of the case. 28  In af-
firming the lower court, the Second Circuit noted, however, that the
result might have been different if the NYSE's rules on arbitral au-
thority were as broad as the AAA's.129 Yet, a strict reading of Garrity
would not permit such a holding since that court stated that "[ain
arbitrator has no power to award punitive damages, even if agreed
upon by the parties."' 30
Shortly after the Southern District decided Fahnestock, that same
124. No. 90 CIV 1792 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 1990).
125. 752 F. Supp. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1991). But see Feinberg, Is Diversity Jurisdiction An Idea
Whose Time Has Passed?, N.Y. STATE BAR J. 14 (July 1989). See also infra note 128.
127. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
128. Fahnestock & Co. v. Waltman, 935 F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1991). In discussing the
diversity jurisdiction of the District Court, the Court of Appeals noted:
The award of the arbitrators was before the district court in this diversity case
for review under state law. As previously noted, state law relating to the pro-
priety of a punitive damage award by arbitrators in the absence of an agreement
on the subject is not preempted by any federal substantive law bearing on the
subject.
Ordinarily, '[iun a diversity action, or in any other lawsuit where state law
provides the basis of decision, the propriety of an award of punitive damages for
the conduct in question ...[is a] question[ ] of state law.' The measure of
damages in general is a matter controlled by New York substantive law where
federal jurisdiction in New York is predicated on the diversity of the parties. It
follows that in this action the Garrity rule prohibiting the award of punitive
damages by arbitrators must be applied. That the rule is grounded in state
policy concerns renders it no less a rule of substantive law.
Id. at 518. (citations omitted). But see Beckley, Go Down Moses: Fahnestock & Co., Inc.
v. Waltman, 4 SEc ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, 3 (1991):
The Second Circuit majority dodges the question by casually announcing that
Fahnestock is based on diversity jurisdiction. Moses Cone was based on diver-
sity; and it was Moses Cone which stated, "Although in some rare circum-
stances the presence of state-law issues may weigh in favor of ... surrender [of
federal jurisdiction] ... the presence of federal issues must always be a major
consideration weighing against surrender."
129. Id. at 519. See also supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. The expansion of
§ 28 of the SICA Code to include broad arbitral authority similar to the AAA's is the
subject of current debate.
130. 40 N.Y.2d at 356.
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court, but a different judge, rendered its decision in Barbier, a case
involving a New York choice-of-law provision and a NYSE punitive
award.' 3I In upholding the punitive award, the court determined that
the choice-of-law provision - which stated that "[t]his agreement
shall... be governed by the laws of the State of New York" '132 - was
ambiguous. Thus, in the absence of a clear indication of the parties'
intent, the Barbier court adopted the narrow view of Volt, holding
that the issue was not whether an arbitrator had the authority to
award punitive damages, but rather, whether punitive damages were
warranted'33 under the substantive law of New York. An appeal
from the Barbier decision is currently pending before the same Second
Circuit that decided the Fahnestock appeal.' 34 Interestingly, the judge
who wrote the majority opinion in the Fahnestock appeal is also a
member of the panel which heard the Barbier appeal.
The outcome of this appeal,' 35 however, is not likely to alleviate
completely the concerns of arbitrators sitting in New York. To be
sure, several important questions still remain unanswered. For exam-
ple, should arbitrators consider: (i) whether or not the arbitration
agreement has a choice-of-law provision; 136 (ii) whether or not that
choice-of-law provision is ambiguous or specifically prohibits punitive
damages;1 37 (iii) whether the arbitration agreement constitutes a con-
tract of adhesion; 138 (iv) whether there is diversity of citizenship
among the parties;3 9 (v) whether the damages fall below the federal
diversity jurisdictional amounts; 14° (vi) whether the dispute is re-
solved by a NASD, NYSE or AAA arbitration panel;' 41 (vii) whether
to manifestly disregard1 42 earlier relevant decisions and decide ac-
cording to equitable assessments while awaiting guidance by the
131. 752 F. Supp. 151, 154.
132. Id. at 153.
133. Id. at 157. See also supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
134. Barbier v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., No. 91-7070 (2d Cir. Sept. 3, 1991).
135. The appeal has been stayed pending the resolution of bankruptcy proceedings
initiated by the appellant following oral argument in the case. See Punitive Damages -
In Brief, 4 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 4, at 4 (1991); Securities Regulation Briefs, 23 SEC.
REG. & LAW REP. 1416, 1416-17 (1991).
136. See supra notes 109-33 and accompanying text.
137. See Barbier, 752 F. Supp. at 157.
138. See infra notes 158-77 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
140. Federal law requires a minimum damage claim of $50,000. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
(1991).
141. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text. See also Noah & Stroughter, Arbi-
tration At the American Stock Exchange, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1989, at 567 (PLI
Seminar).
142. See infra notes 200-04 and accompanying text.
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United States Supreme Court; I43 (viii) whether, if two or more similar
claims are joined, and only one of the claimants has an agreement
containing a choice-of-law clause, punitive damages may be awarded
to the latter but not the former;"* (ix) whether, if just before or dur-
ing the course of the arbitration - but before the award - a change
in the claimant's "citizenship" from one which is different from the
respondent to one which is the same as the respondent, removes the
possible diversity jurisdiction rationale espoused in the Fahnestock
case?145 Little wonder such arbitrators would feel they were sitting in
the Tower of Babel.146
D. The Subtle Extension of the Garrity Influence
It must be emphasized that the purpose of arbitration is to provide
a substitute for the expense and delay of court litigation, and that the
prime goals of arbitration are speed and economy - without compro-
mising fairness.1 47 Accordingly, if arbitration is to remain a viable
alternative to court litigation, it cannot be used as a vehicle to strip
claimants of their remedies. Nor, on the other hand, can a national
securities market be well served by fragmenting relief based upon geo-
graphical location or contractual wizardry. In other words, a New
York customer defrauded by a broker should, for the most part, be
entitled to the same relief as a customer in California who was simi-
larly defrauded by the same broker - particularly if the trades were
executed on the same exchange. To permit such unequal relief to
arise from the inconsistent application of the Garrity prohibition ("the
Garrity factor"), is unsettling in and of itself. Unfortunately, the un-
certainty posed by Garrity would surely create a "spillover" effect by
exerting a subtle influence over the resolution of other matters involv-
ing practice, procedure, and the administration of securities arbitra-
tions. The problems posed by this potential spillover are discussed
below.
1. Effect on Joinder, Consolidation and Hearing Situs
Section 13(d) of the Uniform Code specifically authorizes the join-
der and consolidation of related claims, with the preliminary decision
143. See also American Van Lines, 204 N.Y.L.J. 43, Aug. 30, 1990, at 18, col. 1 (where
the court stayed arbitration of a punitive damage claim).
144. See supra notes 109-34 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
146. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
147. See Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 430-31. See also Fletcher, Arbitrating Securities
Disputes, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1990 (PLI Seminar).
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resting with the SRO Director of Arbitration, and the final determina-
tion to be made by the arbitration panel. 48 Moreover, Section 14 of
the Code provides that the situs of the initial hearing shall be deter-
mined by the Director of Arbitration. 149 In the case of a public cus-
tomer, the arbitration is usually held "near where the customer
resided when the dispute arose regardless of a predispute agreement
to the contrary."' 150 However, other factors such as the place where
business was conducted, the location of witnesses, and jurisdiction
over witnesses, for example, are also considered.' Thus, a question
arises regarding the extent to which the Garrity factor should be con-
sidered in making decisions pertaining to joinder, consolidation and
hearing situs.
The issues posed by applying the Garrity factor in the above con-
texts are best examined through a series of hypotheticals. For exam-
ple, suppose a claimant in the state of X purchases securities through
the local offices of a New York-based brokerage firm, and in the
course of the purchase, signs a pre-dispute arbitration agreement con-
taining a New York choice-of-law provision. Suppose further that the
claimant seeks punitive damages and wants the arbitration to be held
in the state of X, his home state, whereas respondent broker prefers a
New York situs because of the choice-of-law provision invoking Gar-
rity. To what extent shall the Director of Arbitration of the SRO
consider the Garrity factor in selecting the situs on the grounds that
the state of X has adopted a more restrictive view of Garrity and Volt
than the New York courts?15 2
Analyzing the Garrity factor in light of circumstances similar to
those present in the Fahnestock 151 case poses another procedural
problem. In Fahnestock, the arbitration was held in New York, and
the claimant filed a petition in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to
148. See Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 438.
149. Id. at 439.
150. PROCEDURES BOOKLET, supra note 49, at 7.
151. See Masucci, Maintaining The Fairness of Arbitration, in SECURITIES ARBITRA-
TION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 141, 150 (1989); L. LOWENFELS AND A. BROMBERG,
SECURITIES INDUSTRY ARBITRATION: AN EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS § 863, at 37.
In 1990, the NYSE conducted hearings in 38 cities - 65% of which were held outside of
New York City; similarly, NASD conducted hearings in 46 cities - over 70% of which
were outside of New York City. See Morris and Masucci, supra note 57, at 235.
152. See supra notes 82-134 and accompanying text. See also Robbins, Securities Arbi-
tration from the Arbitrators' Perspective in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1991, at 71, 86
(PLI Seminar). "Because a New Yorker's threshold of outrage seems to be higher than
that of individuals residing on the mainland, punitive damage awards are not as frequent
in the Big Apple as they are throughout the rest of the country. But they are being
awarded, with attorney's fees, even in New York." Id.
153. 882 F.2d 6. See supra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
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confirm the award pursuant to the NYSE Arbitration Rules. 54 Re-
spondent subsequently filed a petition in the Southern District of New
York to vacate the award under the FAA on the grounds that the
arbitrators had exceeded their powers. The Pennsylvania federal
court stayed the petition to confirm the arbitral award pending the
outcome of the motion to vacate in the New York federal court. In
deciding that New York was a more proper venue than Pennsylvania,
the District Court in Fahnestock 155 reasoned that "since the award
was made in this district, venue is proper here."15 6 In our original
hypothetical, however, suppose that: (a) the arbitration was held
outside of New York in the state of X; (b) the claimant moves in the
Federal District Court of X to confirm a punitive award rendered in
an arbitration held in the state of X; (c) respondent, in a replay of
Fahnestock, moves in New York to stay the confirmation action in the
state of X; and (d) the Federal District Court in the state of X refuses
to issue a stay based on the fact that the state of X is the more proper
venue because the arbitration was held there.'57 Since that court's
jurisdiction in the state of X does not necessarily depend upon diver-
sity, would it therefore be less inclined to apply Garrity?
Similarly, suppose that two claimants - A (citizen of New York)
and B (citizen of state Y) - have filed related claims in arbitration
against the same respondent (citizen of New York); A has a New
York choice-of-law provision in his arbitration agreement, Whereas B
has none; and, respondent moves to consolidate the two claims.
Should such consolidation be denied because of possible prejudice to
the punitive damage claims of either A or B? Indeed, these scenarios
pose significant challenges for lawmakers.
2. Contracts of Adhesion
The suggestion that punitive damages can be eliminated in securi-
ties arbitration-either through the insertion of restrictive choice-of-
law provisions (i.e., provisions applying New York law), 58 or clauses
154. Rule 627(a) provides that awards rendered by an arbitration panel "may be en-
tered as a judgment in any court of competent jurisdiction."
155. No. 90 CIV 1792, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11024 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
156. Id., slip. op. at 15. Although the court found venue proper in both New York and
Pennsylvania, it chose on the basis of 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1991). Id. "For the conven-
ience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer
any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought." Id.
157. In Fahnestock, No. 90 CIV 1792, the arbitration was held in New York, a fact
which was accorded significant weight by the court in deciding whether to transfer the
case to Pennsylvania. See supra notes 154-56.
158. See Barbier, 752 F. Supp. at 157.
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specifically prohibiting such awards' "-raises interesting possibilities.
For example, assume that through coincidence, design, osmosis, capil-
lary action, gravity, or the law of the jungle, such clauses find their way
into most pre-dispute securities arbitration agreements.' 60 At that
point the issue of adhesion should be closely examined.' 6 '
The doctrine of adhesion provides a basis for refusing to enforce a
contractual agreement.162 Adhesion arises when a standardized con-
tract, usually drafted by a party of superior bargaining power, is
presented to a party whose choice is limited to accepting or rejecting
the contract without having the opportunity to negotiate its terms. 163
Such agreements usually exist when a party enters into similar trans-
actions with many individuals,"6 and the agreements resemble ulti-
matums or laws rather than mutually negotiated contracts.
65
Generally, there are two judicially imposed limitations on the en-
forcement of adhesion contracts or their provisions: first, regardless
of any general "duty to read," such a contract or provision which
does not fall within the reasonable expectations of the weaker or 'ad-
hering' party will not be enforced against him; 66 second, a contract or
a provision, even if consistent with the reasonable expectations of the
parties, will be denied enforcement if, considered in its context, it is
unduly oppressive, unconscionable or against public policy. 67  A
159. Id.
160. See Stewart, supra note 117.
[I]n the interim, attorneys who are drafting arbitration agreements, and who
wish to bar the arbitrators' ability to award punitive damages, should consider
doing at least the following two things: first, state specifically that New York
substantive and procedural law is to govern the proceedings; and second, state
that the application of New York law is to the exclusion of any other state's law
and federal law, except where federal law is in direct conflict.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
161. See infra notes 162-77 and accompanying text.
162. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 9-41 to 9-46 (3d ed. 1987) [here-
inafter CALAMARI & PERILLO].
163. Id.; see also QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW
DIGEST -302[A] at -95-96 (1978).
164. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43
COLUMB. L. REV. 629, 631 (1943); Lenhoff, Contracts of Adhesion and the Freedom of
Contract: A Comparative Study in the Light of American and Foreign Law, 36 TUL. L.
REV. 481, 481-82 (1962).
165. See Siegelman v. Cunard White Star Ltd., 221 F.2d 189, 206 (2d Cir. 1955); Slaw-
son, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 529, 553 (1971).
166. See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 28 Cal.3d 807, 818, 623 P.2d 165, 172-73, 171
Cal.Rptr. 604, 612 (1981).
167. See id.; cf Chretian v. Donald L. Bren Co., 151 Cal. App. 3d 385, 388, 198 Cal.
Rptr. 523, 525, (1984) (court may deny enforcement of a nonadhesive contract if terms
are unconscionable, or may limit application of any unconscionable clause). It would
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great deal has been written about the interrelationship of the duty to
read, reasonable expectations, unconscionability and public policy, 6 '
but it is unnecessary to broadly review such material in this article.
Instead, the inquiry must be narrowed to the subject at hand by mak-
ing certain assumptions.
First, assume that a customer is required to sign an arbitration
clause typical of the clauses found in standard broker-customer secur-
ities agreements before he can open an account. 169 Would a customer
be relieved of his arbitration obligation because there was no duty to
read, and consequently no true assent? This is apparently not the
case, given that the investor could reasonably have expected to find a
pre-dispute arbitration clause in the agreement. 170  Would such a
clause be contrary to public policy? Again, probably not, because of
the policies underlying the Arbitration Act.17
A more interesting question, however, focuses on whether a typical
industry-wide arbitration agreement, regularly imposed by the securi-
ties industry upon its customers, 112 may be considered unenforceable
on grounds that it is unduly oppressive or unconscionable. Although
this type of transaction constitutes "commerce" and is therefore cov-
ered by the Arbitration Act, 173 the point is not a moot one since there
is an exception when grounds exist, at law or in equity, for the revoca-
tion of any contract. 174
While some courts have recognized the issue of adhesion, it appears
that most courts have not considered adhesion to be a problem in the
case of customer agreements containing securities arbitration
clauses. 175 In those cases, however, the clause at issue usually in-
volved the arbitration of securities disputes before one or more of the
SROs. If these arbitration clauses are now expanded to also deny pu-
appear, however, that the burden of establishing unconscionability is greater in the case
of a freely negotiated contract than it is when a party of superior bargaining power im-
poses an industry-wide form upon the weaker party. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Mo-
tors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 386, 161 A.2d 69, 84 (1960). One commentator has noted that
"[a]n arbitration clause is especially vulnerable to attack if one party has not voluntarily
agreed to it, because a fundamental factor in the courts' willingness to enforce arbitration
clauses is their voluntary nature." Wright, Arbitration Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 33
ARB. J. at 43 (1978) (footnote omitted); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Demo-
cratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 549-61 (1983).
168. See CALAMARI & PERILLO, supra note 163, § 9-37-46 at 398-428.
169. See Katsoris I, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
170. Id.
171. See supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
172. See Katsoris I, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
173. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1982).
174. Id. § 2.
175. See Katsoris II, supra note 32, at 373-74.
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nitive damages, the courts should re-examine whether such clauses
are oppresive or unconscionable;' 76 and if the courts do not, then
Congress should take up the issue."'
V. The Garrity Tradeoff
One of the principle purposes of the SICA Code was to achieve
uniformity in handling disputes between customers and their bro-
kers.' 78 Consequently, geographic "Balkanization"' 79 of these dispute
resolution procedures - and the resultant relief - is not desirable.
Indeed, the court in Securities Industry Association v. Connolly, s°
which ruled that a state's restriction on the signing of a pre-dispute
arbitration agreement was pre-empted by the FAA,'' discouraged
fragmentation of regulation.18 2
It follows that the basic treatment of punitive damages in securities
arbitration disputes should also be uniform, particularly since arbitra-
tors are dealing with markets that are national in scope and interstate
by nature. For example, punitive damages are uniformly denied in
the case of federal securities law violations; 83 yet treble damages must
be awarded for RICO violations.8 4 Accordingly, why can't there be
a uniform rule to govern punitive damages for non-federal securities
law violations?
To be sure, punitive damages are not routinely awarded.8 5 This is
so because of the higher burden of proof which generally requires a
showing of gross, wanton or willful fraud or other morally culpable
conduct. 1 6 To eliminate punitive damages in securities cases, how-
ever - through restrictive choice-of-law clauses or otherwise -
would encourage and condone unscrupulous conduct by brokers if
they were assured that their liability would be limited solely to com-
pensatory damages. 8 7 Indeed, assurance that respondents in securi-
176. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
177. See infra note 230.
178. See supra notes 39-57 and accompanying text.
179. "To cause (as a region) to separate into hostile units; referring to the inharmoni-
ous conditions prevailing in the Balkan states (Bulgaria, Romania, Serbia, etc.), especially
at the time of the Balkan Wars (1912-13)." See WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL Dic-
TIONARY 208 (2d ed. 1943).
180. 703 F. Supp. 146 (D. Mass. 1988), aff'd, 883 F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 1105 S. Ct. 2559 (1990).
181. Id. at 153. See also supra notes 90-98 and accompanying text.
182. Id. at 155.
183. See supra note 61.
184. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
185. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 1, § 2.1(c) at 23.
186. Id.
187. See S. GOLDBERG, supra note 17, at 2.
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ties disputes would be free from punitive damage sanctions would also
discourage equally culpable brokerage firms from entering into mean-
ingful settlement negotiations - no matter how outrageous their con-
duct. In other words, why should a respondent make a realistic
settlement offer at the outset if the customer is prohibited from receiv-
ing greater relief after a lengthy and costly proceeding?."' The solu-
tion to this dilemma lies in allowing punitive damages to be awarded
in arbitration to the same extent permitted in courtroom litigation;
however, a compromise should be reached in order to allay the Gar-
rity court's fears of non-reviewable, runaway awards.1 8 9
The first element of the compromise - or "tradeoff" - proposes
that punitive awards rendered through arbitration should be readily
reviewable. 190 Second, it is somewhat illogical that arbitrators are
perfectly capable of meting out treble RICO awards, which are puni-
tive in nature, 9' but incapable of issuing punitive damage awards.
Accordingly, to eliminate this inconsistency of treatment and insure
that no exemplary overlap occurs between treble damages under
RICO and punitive damages,' 92 it is further suggested that this trade-
off include the elimination or restriction of RICO claims. Thus, in
exchange for a uniform nationwide rule permitting arbitrators to im-
pose punitive damages in securities disputes, (a) such awards should
be generally reviewable, and (b) RICO claims should be severely re-
stricted or eliminated. 93 The balance of this section will examine the
elements of this tradeoff.
A. Judicial Review
The scope of judicial review of an arbitration award is very lim-
188. Id.
189. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
.190. See infra notes 194-200 and accompanying text.
191. See supra notes 62-67 and accompanying text. See also infra notes 212-20 and
accompanying text.
192. To the extent such overlap may exist, either de facto or de jure, see D. ABRAMS,
supra note 64, § 3.4.2, at 157-58: "Where a civil RICO claim is joined with state or other
federal claims, however, most decisions conclude that an otherwise permissible punitive
damage award remains available on a non-RICO claim. A Ninth Circuit panel, however,
suggested (without deciding) that RICO might preempt punitive damage awards on state
claims that are based on the same underlying activity that gives rise to the civil RICO
claim. In any event, at least one decision declined to impose punitive damages on a non-
RICO claim on the grounds that civil RICO trebling itself imposed sufficient punishment
on the defendant."
193. The proposed tradeoff clearly suggests Congressional action at some level, most
probably by amending the FAA and revising the RICO statute.
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ited. 194 "If the award is within the submission, and contains the hon-
est decision of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the
parties, a court of equity will not set it aside for error, either in law or
fact."' 9 5 In fact, the typical grounds for vacating an arbitration
award 196 are surprisingly uniform throughout the United States.' 97
Furthermore, finality of the award is one of the principal advantages
of arbitration, in that it avoids the costs and delays of endless ap-
peals. '9 Thus, an award which has a legal or factual basis which may
be rationally inferred from the evidence will be upheld. 99 Nonethe-
less, although courts generally will not set aside an award for a mis-
take of law, they will so vacate where the arbitrators have acted in
"manifest disregard" of the law.2 °°
194. See Goldberg, A Supreme Court Justice Looks at Arbitration, 20 ARB. J. 13, 14-15
(1965).
195. Burchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. 344, 349 (1854).
196. On this point, the FAA provides:
In either of the following cases the United States court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration-
(a) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(b) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or
either of them.
(c) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evi-
dence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other
misbehavior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced.
(d) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly exe-
cuted them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.
(e) Where an award is vacated and the time within which the agreement
required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discre-
tion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C. § 10 (1991). See also Krebsbach & Friedman, Defending Brokerage Firms
Against Customer Complaints in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1991, at 589, 614-15 (PLI
Seminar); Kavaler, Campbell, Rubinson & Siskind, supra note 79, at 708-09.
197. See Goldberg, supra note 182, § 6.03 at 63; see also Smiley, Stockbroker-Customer
Disputes; Making A Case for Arbitration, 23 GA. ST. B.J. 195 (1987).
198. See Smiley, supra note 197, at 200.
199. Id. As to the possibility of sanctions for frivolous challenges, see Brunelle, Judi-
cial Proceeings in Aid of Arbitration, in SECURITIES ARBITRATION 1991, at 733, 741
(PLI Seminar): "Challenging an arbitral award in a U.S. District Court carries with it a
serio'us risk that if the petition is unsuccessful, and the Court finds it to have been frivo-
lous, the petitioner and its counsel may be sanctioned under Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 11.
Quick & Reilly, Inc. v. Jacobson, 126 F.R.D. 24 (1989). Although sanctions may also be
imposed by the New York State Courts, 22 NYCRR § 130.1-1(a), the risk in that forum,
as a practical matter, is much lower. Ministers, Elders & Deacons, etc. v. 198 Broadway,
Inc., 76 N.Y.2d 411 (1990)." See also Vairo, Rule 11 Sanctions: Case Law Perspectives
and Preventive Measures, in PRENTICE HALL LAW AND BUSINESS 107-09 (1990); Une-
ven Use Mars Rule 11, Nat. L.J., Aug. 5, 1991, at 13, col. 1.
200. See Smiley, supra note 197, at 200.
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"Manifest disregard" of the law is a judicially created ground for
vacating an arbitration award "even though not specifically listed
under 9 U.S.C. § 10 of the Federal Arbitration Act."2 1 Although the
limits on the use of this rationale have never been definitively out-
lined, "manifest disregard" clearly means more than mere error or
misunderstanding with respect to the law.202 For an award to be va-
cated under this theory, "the error must have been. . . readily and
instantly perceived by the average person qualified to serve as an arbi-
trator. ' 20 3 "Moreover, the term 'disregard' implies that the arbitrator
appreciated the existence of a clearly governing legal principle but
decides to ignore or pay no attention to it. ' '2 °4
Given the limited grounds for vacating an award, how can the Gar-
rity fear of non-reviewability be alleviated? Some have suggested bi-
furcated proceedings 2 5 - that is, to try the punitive claim separately
before a judge or jury. The delay, extra cost and possibility for incon-
sistent or incompatible outcomes that could result from such a proce-
dure is hardly the panacea for a court system clogged with other
cases.20 6 On the other hand, letting the arbitrators decide the entire
case, and requiring that only the punitive damage portion of the
201. Fahnestock, 1190 U.S. Dist. Lexis 11024, slip. op. at 6 (1990).
202. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Bobken, 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir.
1986).
203. Id. at 933.
204. Id.
205. See 4 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 1, at 4 (Jan. 1991); see also COMMERCIAL AND
FEDERAL LITIGATION SECTION OF THE NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION, REPORT
ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1990). Some commentators
have suggested "[p]rohibiting arbitrators from awarding punitive damages under any cir-
cumstances, but providing a procedure for a prevailing party in arbitration to seek puni-
tive damages in a subsequent court proceeding (which procedure might be made available
(a) generally, or (b) only if the parties expressly reference it in their agreement)." Id. at
24.
206. See New Tactics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 29, 1989, at Al, col. 1. "'We're becoming drug courts,' says Edward R.
Becker, a Federal appeals judge in Philadelphia .... 'The short of it is that we're getting
an enormous volume of drug cases and its making it very difficult in many jurisdictions to
hear civil cases.'" See also Wise, City's Federal Trial Courts Show Rise in Pending Cases,
N.Y.L.J. Sept. 11, 1991, at 1, col. 3; The Federal Courts Have a Drug Problem, Bus. Wk.,
Mar. 26, 1990 at 76; Drastic Moves Urged to Ease US. Court's Load, N.Y. Times, Mar.
23, 1990, at B5, col. 3. Indeed, in California, the Los Angeles County Bar Association
filed suit in Federal court to appoint more state court judges because it takes about five
years for a civil case to come to trial. See Marcotte, L.A. County Bar Sues California, 74
A.B.A. J. 28 (1988). See also Lawsuits in Federal Courts, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1987, at
B6, col. 6; Congress Now Considering Dispute Resolution Measures, Nat. L.J., Feb. 5,
1990, at 1, col. 1; Randall Sanborn, Courting Solutions, Nat. L.J., July 1, 1991, at 1, col.
1; Verhovek, Chief State Judge Is Suing Cuomo To Get More Monet' for the Courts, N.Y.
Times, Sept. 26, 1991, at Al, col. 5.
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award be subject to general judicial review,2"7 would be more efficient
and could serve to alleviate some of the apprehension expressed by the
court in Garrity.2° s To make such review meaningful, however, a rec-
ord of the proceedings must be kept;20 9 otherwise, to attempt to re-
construct what occurred during the arbitration proceedings would
invariably result in a battle of affidavits. 210 Similarly, awards should
be in writing, and should clearly and separately identify the compo-
nents of the award.2 1 Moreover, in the case of a punitive damage
award, explaining the grounds for its rendition should be encouraged.
Only with these safeguards can a reviewing body understand the ra-
tionale of a punitive award in order to meaningfully judge its
adequacy.
B. Elimination of RICO
Allowing for reviewability of punitive damage awards rendered
through arbitration calls to mind the present non-reviewable status of
RICO treble damage awards in such proceedings.212 As is the case
with punitive damages, the awarding of treble damages under RICO
is currently the subject of much debate, and has become equally prob-
lematic in the context of arbitration. 13 This is particularly true since
such damages are routinely pleaded as alternative relief in statements
of claim.214
The McMahon decision clearly recognized the arbitrability of
RICO treble damage claims in securities disputes.215 Much discus-
207. This could be accomplished by adding punitive damages as a grounds for vacating
that portion of an award under the FAA. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text.
208. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying text. Although such review might ad-
mittedly slow down the arbitration process, this effort would be limited to the relatively
few instances where punitive damages were awarded, and would clearly be justified on the
grounds of fairness. Moreover, a review procedure would be much more desirable than
allowing punitive damage claims to be tried in bifurcated proceedings. See Friedman,
Punitive Damages in Securities Cases, N.Y.L.J., May 2, 1991, at 3, 30. As to the undesir-
ability of bifurcated proceedings generally, see Katsoris III, supra note 35.
209. Such a record is already required by the SICA code. See Katsoris I, supra note 25
at 446. See also Katsoris, I Won't Sit Without a Record, 3 SEC. ARB. COMMENTATOR 9,
at I, col. 2 (Sept. 1990).
210. Id. at 2.
211. See Morris, Arbitration At The New York Stock Exchange, in SECURITIES ARBI-
TRATION PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 95, 119 (Nov. 17, 1989) (on file at the office of the
Fordham Urban Law Journal).
212. In fact, the FAA does not reference RICO in its discussion of grounds for vacat-
ing an arbitration award. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text. However, this article need not
examine all the elements of the RICO debate in detail.
214. See Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 449.
215. See supra notes 68-71 and accompanying text.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
sion has been generated, however, over whether RICO should be re-
stricted or abolished - not just in securities arbitration, but in civil
litigation generally.2 16 Indeed, the overall desirability of permitting
RICO allegations in securities arbitration is questionable. In the first
place, although such damage claims are routinely pleaded, they are
seldom proven. By the same token, the mere allegation of a securities
violation under RICO severely bogs down the arbitration proceed-
ing.2 17 Most importantly, perhaps, is the fact that arbitration awards
under RICO are generally not reviewable.21 8 Certainly, it is inconsis-
tent to suggest that punitive damage awards in securities arbitrations
should be reviewable while RICO treble damage awards are not. In
addition, assuming that punitive damages become universally avail-
able in securities arbitrations, the potential for de facto overlap be-
216. See RICO v. RICO, Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1989, at A22, col. 1; RICO's Taxing
Problem, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1989, at A14, col. 3; RICO: The Law as Thug, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 13, 1989, at All, col. 1; Uncertain Future for RICO Cases, Business and the Law,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1989, at D2, col. 1; High Powered Bid to Gut RICO Law is Derailed
By Unrelated Scandals, Backers'Seeming Greed, Wall St. J., Nov. 9, 1989, at A18, col. 1.
It is interesting to note the following pro and anti RICO lobbies:
For Proposed RICO limits:
* National Association of Manufacturers
* AFL-CIO
* American Civil Liberties Union
* American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
* American Bar Association
* American Bankers Association
* Securities Industry Association
* American Life League (anti-abortion group)
* Defendants in pending civil RICO cases
Against proposed RICO limits:
* Public Citizen (Ralph Nader consumer group)
* U.S. Public Interest Research Group (state consumer groups)
* National Association of Insurance Commissioners
* National Association of Attorneys General
* National Association of Securities and Commercial Law Attorneys (plaintiffs'
lawyers)
* Plaintiffs in pending RICO cases.
Id. See also RICO and The Securities Laws, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1981, at 3, col. 1; Review
and Outlook, RICO's Stinkin'Badges, Wall St. J., July 5, 1991, at A6 col. 1; D. ROBBINS,
SECURITIES ARBITRATION PROCEDURE MANUAL 28-31 (1990); House Subcommittee
Approves Bill to Limit Use of Civil Rico Lawsuits, 23 SEC. REG. & LAW REPT. 711, 726
(1991); McMillion, ABA Seeks End of Civil RICO Abuses, A.B.A. J. (Oct. 1991).
217. As to the complexities of RICO, see generally Abrams, Civil RICO's Cause of
Action: The Landscape After Sedima, 12 TULANE MAR. L.J. 19 (1988). See also Page,
Smiley, & Goddard, Representing Customers in Securities Arbitration, in SECURITIES AR-
BITRATION 1991, 527, 549 (PLI Seminar): "Although treble damages are provided for
under the federal RICO statutes and in some state RICO statutes, arbitrators are reluc-
tant to award RICO damages." Id.
218. See supra notes 196 & 212 and accompanying text
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tween these damages and RICO treble damage awards militates in
favor of restricting or abolishing altogether RICO claims in securities
disputes.2"9 For all of these reasons, the application of RICO in se-
curities matters should be narrowed or eliminated, leaving punish-
ment and deterrence to be doled out in the form of punitive damages
and SRO discipline.22°
VI. Conclusion
When a dispute persists between a customer and a broker, the path
to relief is generally arbitration or court litigation. The choice, how-
ever, should only involve the differences in procedure, not the quan-
tum of relief sought. The procedural differences, therefore, should
not result in less relief because one forum is chosen over the other. To
create such an imbalance is unconscionable, particularly if the forum
of less relief is effectively mandated upon the public.2 2 1
Whether punitive damages should be generally awarded is not the
question. Rather the issue is whether a claimant should expect the
same remedies in arbitration as in courtroom litigation. The answer is
decidedly yes! Arbitration still has an image problem, despite great
efforts to create a level playing field.2 22 To saddle arbitration with the
restriction that it provides for less relief than available in court would
rekindle the suspicion that SRO arbitration creates an atmosphere of
a stacked deck.223
219. Whether or not such overlap exists as a matter of law, however, is yet undecided.
See Abrams, supra note 192. Nonetheless, the possibility of overlap could prove mischie-
vous in the rendering of arbitration awards. For example, when faced with a punitive
situation, will the arbitrator award general punitive damages, damages pursuant to
RICO, or both? Moreover, would the fact that one was generally reviewable and the
other not, influence arbitrators in making such a choice? This possibility poses a problem
similar to that which the Garrity court feared. See supra notes 82-84 and accompanying
text.
220. As discussed earlier, the securities industry seems willing to handle such a task.
See, e.g., Katsoris I, supra note 25, at 450. See also Brokers, Firms Are Disciplined for
Violations, Wall St. J., July 5, 1991, at B3A, col. 5; Pritchett, Ex-Broker Gets $2.25 Mil-
lion Fine In Fraud Case, Wall St. J., July 8, 1991, at C16, col. 4; NASD Announces Disci-
plinary Actions Against Number of Firms and Persons, Wall St. J., Aug. 16, 199 1, at A3A,
col. 1. For an example of such disciplinary authority, see NASD Code of Procedures,
Art. IV, § I in NASD MANUAL (CCH) 3049, at 3151.
221. See Katsoris I, supra note 25 and accompanying text.
222. See Herriques, When Naiet6 Meets Wall Street, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 1989, § 3 at
I, col 2. See also Is the Game Rigged?, Newsweek, Sept. 30, 1991, at 49.
223. See Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 260 (1987) (Black-
mun, J. dissenting). In his dissenting opinion, Justice Blackmun was troubled by the
nagging complaint that we may be "compelling an investor to arbitrate securities claims
... in a forum controlled by the securities industry." Id. This stems from a belief by
some that the uniform opposition of investors to compel arbitration and the overwhelm-
19911 PUNITIVE DAMAGES 603
If punitive damages in arbitration are not generally reviewable,
while those obtained in courtroom litigation are, then the arbitration
playing field would tilt in favor of claimants. Accordingly, along with
providing similar relief - in other words, treating punitive damages
in arbitration just as they are treated in courtroom litigation - the
law must also provide for the reviewability of such awards. 224 Thus,
insuring the awardability of punitive damages in arbitration requires
simultaneous judicial reviewability of such awards. 225  At the same
time, and as part of the package, lawmakers should seize the opportu-
nity to effectively yet fairly streamline the resolution of securities dis-
putes - both in arbitration and courtroom litigation - by
eliminating, or at least limiting, the often duplicitous and parallel
RICO remedy in such disputes. 22 6 In this manner, exemplary dam-
ages would be meted out through reviewable discretionary punitive
damage awards, instead of non-reviewable RICO awards obtained in
arbitration.227
Finally, if the securities industry wishes to reign-in punitive damage
exposure, it should do so on a broad front and not just in arbitration
through Garrity. Otherwise, arbitration will become the industry's
Trojan Horse 228 by attempting to achieve indirectly - through basi-
cally adhesive agreements 229 - what it cannot get the courts or Con-
gress to do directly.230 Such a tilting of the playing field would no
ing support of the securities industry for the process suggests that there must be some
truth to the investors belief that the securities industry has an advantage in a forum
under its own control. See Glaberson, When The Investor Has A Gripe , N.Y. Times,
Mar. 29, 1987, § 3, at 8, col. 1 ("[tlhe houses basically like the present system because
they own the stacked deck")
224. To permit punitive damage awards issued by courts and juries to be generally
reviewable, while prohibiting review of such awards issued in arbitration, would tilt the
arbitration playing field in favor of claimants.
225. See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See THE ODYSSEY OF HOMER 132-33 (trans. by Ennis Rees 1932).
229. See supra notes 158-77 and accompanying text.
230. See Hinden, GAO Asked To Investigate Securities Arbitration Issues, Wash. Post,
Feb. 7, 1990, at 2, col. 1. See also request by Congressmen Bowsher, Dingell and Markey
to General Accounting Office ("GAO") for a "Comprehensive Study of Securities indus-
try practices with respect to pre-dispute arbitration clauses in customer agreements and
of the arbitration process as sponsored by the securities industry self-regulating organiza-
tions (SROs)." 3 SAC 1&2(7); Ketchum letter from SEC to SROs dated May 10, 1990
concerning alternative forums; see MORRIS AND MASUCCI, supra note 57, at 260-63. See
also Martin, Court Rulings Could Spur Congress on Arbitration, 23 Institutional Investor
Inc., Wall Street Letter, No. 14 at 1 (April 8, 1991); Year in Review, 3 SAC 12, at 3, 4.
"As 1991 proceeds, we expect to see renewed Congressional hearings on the SRO arbitra-
tion process. Where those hearings will lead could easily spell out arbitration's future. In
any case, the stage is being set for some kind of climactic action that will either challenge
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doubt surprise both Hammurabi23' and Aristotle,2 3 2 but more impor-
tantly, would surely tarnish the image of arbitration as an effective
alternative mechanism for settling securities disputes.
the use of mandatory... [mandatory pre-dispute arbitration] or result in a major change
on the 'forum of choice' front." Id. See also supra notes 10-12, 99-134 and accompany-
ing text.
231. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
232. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
